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ABUSING SELF-DETERMINATION AND DEMOCRACY: How THE TPLF Is
LOOTING ETHIOPIA
Matthew J. McCrackent
Introduction
Ethiopia is a nation facing a silent crisis. After Eritrean and Tigrayan
rebels overthrew Ethiopia's socialist-military government in 1991,
members of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (or "TPLF") reorganized
into a new political party known as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (or "EPRDF") and assumed control of Ethiopia's central
government.' After 100 years of domination by the Amhara tribe,
Ethiopia's new government, led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, claimed
to usher in a new era of political openness.2 A former Secretary General of
the TPLF, Zenawi invited representatives from Ethiopia's many regional
and cultural minorities to participate in the drafting of Ethiopia's
Transitional Charter and new Constitution.3
This so-called "Revolutionary Era" produced many significant
political changes. In 1993, Eritrea passed a referendum declaring its
independence and seceded from Ethiopia.4 Ethiopia did not challenge the
referendum, and soon after it passed, the United Nations recognized
Eritrea's sovereignty.5 When Ethiopia's Constitution was ratified in 1994,
it established Ethiopia as a federal republic, and embraced the principle of
self-determination through democratic rule.6 Allegedly to further these
t J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law, May, 2004. I would like to thank
my wife, Aida Bezuneh McCracken, for her insight, patience, and inspiration, without
which, I would not have been able to write this Note.
1 See Aaron P. Micheau, The 1991 Transitional Charter of Ethiopia: A New Application
of the Self-Determination Principle?, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 367, 377-78 (1996)
[hereinafter The 1991 Transitional Charter].
2 SEE FEDERAL RESEARCH DmSIoN, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ETHIOPIA: A COUNTRY
STUDY xxv-xxxvi (Thomas P. Ofcansky & LaVerle Berry eds., 1993), available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html [hereinafter A COUNTRY STUDY].
' See id.
4 See Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in Principle and Practice: the
Ethiopian-Eritrean Experience, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 91, 119 (1997) [hereinafter
Principle and Practice].
5 1d. at 128.
6 See generally ETH. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, 1994), available at http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/constitutions/
etiopia/constitution_1994.htm.
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ends, the Constitution granted all "Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples" in
Ethiopia the unconditional right to secede from the nation. To Ethiopian
minorities and observers in the international community, the country
seemed poised for democratic reform that would end decades of
oppression.
7
However, soon after the new Constitution was ratified, some legal
scholars criticized its provision that allows regions within Ethiopia to
secede.8 According to these scholars, the provision, articulated in Article
39, creates an unworkable form of central government by making it too
easy for the country to break apart.9 Under Article 39, all a region needs to
exercise its right of secession is a referendum passed by a two-thirds
majority of its regional parliament and a separate referendum passed by a
simple majority of the national parliament.' 0
Most of the scholars who have criticized Article 39 assume that its
inclusion in the 1994 Constitution came about as a compromise between the
EPRDF and other regional representatives." Under this assumption, the
EPRDF reluctantly included Article 39 in the Constitution in order to
appease regional calls for self-determination rights by minority populations
who were inspired by Eritrea's secession in 1993.' In other words, the
EPRDF needed to include Article 39 in order to garner support from
Ethiopia's regional governments and preserve the country's national
integrity.
However, recent developments have demonstrated that this assumption
is probably incorrect. A new theory regarding the EPRDF's purpose behind
Article 39 is quietly gaining acceptance in Ethiopian and international
circles. Although this theory is highly speculative, it is also potentially
illuminating and explosive. It has all the hallmarks of a grand conspiracy
theory: it implicates the highest levels of the Ethiopian government; it
involves a far-reaching plan with long-term goals; and it involves the use of
violence and under-handed politics in order to perpetrate a fraud on the
Ethiopian people and the international community. Worst of all, it is
probably correct.
7 See, e.g., Seyoum Hameso, The TPLF Ethiopia: Where Next?, Oromia Online (May
2001), at http://www.oromia.org/Articles/TheTPLFEthiopiaWhere_ Next.htm
[hereinafter The TPLF Ethiopia].
8 See, e.g., Derege Demissie, Note, Self-Determination Including Secession vs. The
Territorial Integrity of Nation-States: A Prima Facie Case for Secession, 20 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 165, 187 (1996) [hereinafter A Prima Facie Case].
9 Id.
1o See ETa. CONST. art. 39.
" See, e.g., The TPLF Ethiopia, supra note 7.
12 See generally A Prima Facie Case, supra note 8.
[Vol. 36:183
LOOTING ETHIOPIA
In brief, the new theory is this: the TPLF-dominated EPRDF
intentionally included Article 39 in Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution so that the
Tigray region could loot Ethiopia of its resources, use the Ethiopian
military to expand the borders of Tigray, and then secede from Ethiopia.
Underlying this theory is the widely held opinion that the TPLF and
EPRDF are not independent organizations, but symbiotic.13
The evidence supporting this theory comes from several sources. Most
importantly, the TPLF put its intentions in writing in the organization's
manifesto known as the "Republic of Greater Tigrai."'14 Drafted by TPLF
leaders in 1976, the manifesto sets forth an elaborate plan for the liberation
of Tigray from Ethiopian rule.' 5 The plan involves two main steps: 1) re-
demarcating Tigray's borders to expand the region's borders within
Ethiopia, and 2) acquiring coastal lands within Eritrea and seceding as an
independent nation.'
The EPRDF has taken several actions that seem to adhere to the plans
set forth in the TPLF manifesto since it took over Ethiopia's central
government in 1991. For example, the TPLF/EPRDF has dramatically
developed the Tigray region since they came to power. Before the 1991
Revolution, Tigray was territorially limited and economically
underdeveloped. Since the Revolution, in addition to trying to acquire
Badme from Eritrea (discussed below), Tigray has successfully annexed
fertile lands from the neighboring regions of Wollo and Gondar within
Ethiopia. 18 When compared with other Ethiopian provinces, Tigray has
experienced disproportionate economic growth and development since
1991. Soon after coming to power, the EPRDF established the Endowment
Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (or "EFFORT") with a considerable
13 Some articles even refer to the TPLF and the EPRDF simultaneously. See, e.g., The
TPLF Ethiopia, supra note 7 (referring to the organizations as the "TPLF/EPRDF"); see
also, Benyam Solomon, Who Benefits from the Eritrean-Ethiopian War?, (Apr. 20, 1999)
available at http://www.denden.com/Conflict/newscom/tplf benefit.html (quoting the
Human Rights Watch's 1999 report which refered to the organizations as the
"EPRDF[TPLF]") [hereinafter Who Benefits].
14 "Tigrai" and "Tigre" are alternate spellings of "Tigray." See Anon., The Manifesto of
the TPLF on "Republic of Greater Tigrai" and The Current Border Conflict Between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, (Aug. 3, 1998) available at http://denden.com/Conflict/tplf-manifesto-
98.htm [hereinafter The Manifesto of the TPLF].
15 Id.
16
1d.
17 See generally John Young, Development and Change in Post-Revolutionary Tigray, 35
J. MODERN AFR. STUDIES 81, 81-99 (1997) [hereinafter Post-Revolutionary Tigray].
18 Martin Stolk, Hidden Agendas of the Horn War?, MIDDLE EAST TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1999,
available at http://www.martinstolk.nl/engels/I 999/hiddenagendas.htm [hereinafter Hidden
Agendas].
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amount of Ethiopian capital.19  Through the EFFORT program, the
TPLF/EPRDF has diverted large quantities of government resources and
international aid to Tigray.20 As a result, Tigray has experienced radical
commercial growth while other regions of Ethiopia have stagnated.2'
More evidence supporting this theory comes from the recent border
dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The dispute perfectly comports with
the TPLF manifesto when one considers what could have happened if
Ethiopia had won. The Tigray region has always had one major weakness:
it is landlocked.22 When Eritrea seceded in 1992, it took all of Ethiopia's
access to the Red Sea with it.23 If Ethiopia had succeeded in annexing the
Eritrean region of Burie during the recent border dispute, it would have cut
off Eritrea's access to its port city of Assab. 4 Located in the southernmost
region of Eritrea,25 Assab would have once again given Ethiopia access to
the Red Sea. In addition, according to the 1976 manifesto, Assab borders
certain Ethiopian lands within the borders of "Greater Tigrai., 26 Thus,
annexing Assab from Eritrea would have allowed the TPLF to "liberate"
regions of "Greater Tigrai" and gain access to the Red Sea in accordance
with the manifesto.
Finally, Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution also conforms to the 1976 TPLF
manifesto by giving Tigray a "legal" means for secession from Ethiopia.
One might argue that by granting the right to secede to all "Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples" the TPLF limited its ability to exploit other
regions of Ethiopia. After all, if other regions felt they were being
exploited by the EPRDF, they would probably secede themselves.
However, as this article will make clear, other regions of Ethiopia have
tried to secede under Article 39, and the TPLF/EPRDF has used violence
and underhanded politics in order to undermine them.27 In particular, the
EPRDF has repeatedly suppressed calls for independence by members of
the Oromo tribe and Ethio-Somalis living in the Ogaden.28
19 See Post-Revolutionary Tigray, supra note 17, at 85.
20 id.
21 See id. at 85-86.
22 See Map of Ethiopia's Administrative Zones in Appendix 1.
23 See Map of the Ethiopia - Eritrea Border in Appendix 2.
24 Hidden Agendas, supra note 18.
25 See Appendix 2.
26 See David Hirst, Human waves fall as war aims unfold, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (1999),
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3866153,00.html
[hereinafter Human Waves].
27 See, e.g., Who Benefits, supra note 13.
28 See generally The TPLF Ethiopia, supra note 7; Ogaden Human Rights Committee,
Background, OGADEN ONLINE (2002), at http://www.ogaden.com/Background.htm
[hereinafter, Ogaden Online Background].
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The purpose of this article is to bring the hidden agenda of Ethiopia's
central government to the attention of the international community. The
TPLF is abusing the international legal principles of democracy and self-
determination in order to further their illegitimate aims. By declaring itself
to be a democracy, Ethiopia has been able to secure financial aid from
Western nations including the United States.
2 9 Along with resources
obtained from other regions within Ethiopia, this international aid has been
disproportionately diverted to Tigray by the TPLF-dominated central
government.30 Furthermore, the TPLF has used Ethiopian soldiers to fight a
war against Eritrea on its behalf in an attempt to expand the borders of
Tigray.3
According to the TPLF's own manifesto, Tigray plans to secede from
Ethiopia. 2 To this end, the TPLF/EPRDF has created a Constitution that33
will allow them to secede. If Tigray secedes, it will leave Ethiopia in
chaos. With no central leadership and stripped of its resources, Ethiopia
might cease to exist. Ethiopia's Balkanization would likely create great
instability in the Horn of Africa.
The United Nations has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to
grant sovereignty to "people" who claim independence based on the
principle of self-determination.34 Specifically, various United Nations
resolutions support self-determination for two types of populations: 1) post-
colonial peoples and 2) peoples suppressed by "foreign domination."
35
However, the situation in present-day Ethiopia does not fit neatly into one
of these categories. The UN has never confronted the question of whether a
dominant minority population may secede from its nation-state in the name
of self-determination. Will the United Nations allow the TPLF to loot
29 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY,
CONFLCIT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (DCHA) - Ethiopia Drought Fact Sheet #1 (FY
2003), U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) (2002), available at
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/sDCFCF9C04F06BECA85256C4F00749170
[hereinafter Ethiopia Fact Sheet].
30 See Who Benefits, supra note 13.
31 See Human Waves, supra note 26.
32 See Who Benefits, supra note 13; The Manifesto of the TPLF, supra note 14.
33 See ET. CONST. art. 39.
34 See generally Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis, Self-Determination: ItsEevolution and
Practice by the United Nations and Its Application to the Case of Eritrea, 6 Wis. INT'L L.J.
75-127 (1987) [hereinafter Self-Determination: Its Evolution], see also, Principle and
Practice, supra note 4.
35 Self-Determination: Its Evolution, supra note 34, at 92-93.
36 See Herb Feith & Alan Smith, Self-determination in the 1990s: Equipping the UN to
Resolve Ethno-Nationalist Conflicts, in CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 143-162 (Kumar
Rupensinghe ed., 1995). All of the previous claims for self-determination that have been
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Ethiopia of its resources in the name of self-determination and under the
guise of democracy?
This article is organized into four sections: Section One summarizes
the history of the present crisis facing Ethiopia. Section Two analyzes the
legal rights of regional governments under Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution
and explores ways that the TPLF/EPRDF has suppressed those rights.
Section Three presents evidence that the TPFL is attempting to loot
Ethiopia and assert Tigray's independence. Finally, Section Four considers
the legality of Tigray's potential secession under international law.
I. History of the Crisis
The consolidation of modern-day Ethiopia (including Eritrea) began in
the late thirteenth century with the emergence of the Amhara, or Solomonic
dynasty.37 Through a gradual process of military expansion, the Amhara
assimilated neighboring tribal communities in ancient Abyssinia.38 In the
late nineteenth century, the Ethiopian Empire came into conflict with
European colonial invaders from Italy, Britain, and France. 39 Throughout
this period, despite the growing external conflicts, Ethiopia continued to
expand. Although continued warfare forced Ethiopia to cede Eritrea to the
Italians, the country expanded into the Southern regions of present-day
Ethiopia.40 By the mid-nineteenth century, Ethiopia occupied lands to the
South and Southwest inhabited by the semi-nomadic Oromo tribe.4'
A. The King Menelik II Era
In 1889, King Menelik II became the autocratic ruler of the Ethiopian
Empire.42  Menelik II established a new capital at Addis Ababa and
succeeded in uniting the provinces of Tigray and Amhara with Shewa.43 In
1895, Menelik was able to reoccupy Eritrea and force Italian colonialists
out of the region with his decisive victory at the battle of Aduwa.44
brought before the United Nations have come from populations seeking either independence
or relief from dominant regimes or foreign governments.
37 The 1991 Transitional Charter, supra note 1, at 370.
38 Id.
39 Id.
41 See Principle and Practice, supra note 4, at 10 1-102.
42 See A Prima Facie Case, supra note 8, at 179.
43 Id. at 179-180.
44 Id. at 180. "Adowa" and "Adwa" are alternate spellings of "Aduwa." See also Kristin
Henrard & Stefaan Smis, Recent Experiences in South Africa and Ethiopia to Accommodate
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Menelik II expanded the Empire further by annexing territories occupied by
the Afar and Sidama. 45  By the turn of the twentieth century, Ethiopia
encompassed the majority of the Horn of Africa.46
B. The Haile Selassie Era
Haile Selassie became Emperor of Ethiopia in 1930. 47 A member of
the Amhara tribe, Haile Selassie began a process of what some have called
"Amharatization" by outlawing the teaching of all languages other than• • • 48
Amharic throughout the Ethiopian Empire. The Amhara tribe, although a
numerical minority, dominated Ethiopian national affairs.49
With the rise of the dictator Benito Mussolini, Italy revived its interest
in Ethiopia and invaded the country once again in 1935. 50 The following
year the Italians conducted a successful military campaign that culminated
in the fall of Addis Ababa. After the Allies defeated the Italians at the
conclusion of World War II, Ethiopia was liberated, and Haile Selassie,
who had been forced to flee by the occupying Italians, reclaimed the
throne.5' Although Ethiopia regained most of its former territory following
World War II, British forces continued to occupy Eritrea in trust after the
War.5
2
In 1950, the United Nations made Eritrea a federal republic under
Ethiopian control.53  Ethiopia gradually eroded this federal relationship
until it formally annexed Eritrea in 1962. Following this annexation,
groups of liberation-minded students and scholars quietly began amassing
within Eritrea and other regions of Ethiopia.5 During its two periods of
Italian occupation, Eritrea had begun to develop a national identity
independent of Ethiopia. 6 Periodic uprisings in Eritrea were quelled with
Cultural Diversity: A Regained Interest in the Right the Self-Determination, 44 J. AFR. L. 1,
17, 39 (2000) [hereinafter A Regained Interest].
45 Id.
46 See Map of the Horn of Africa in Appendix 3.
47 See Principle and Practice, supra note 4, at 102.
48 See The 1991 Transitional Charter, supra notel, at 372.
49 See id. at 3 72-73.
50 See id. at 371.
51 See id. at 372.
52 See Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV.,
479-537, 484 ( Fall 1994) [hereinafter Legality of Secessions].
53 Id. at 485-486.
54 The 1991 Transitional Charter, supra note 1, at 372.
55 See Id. at 374.
56 See Principle and Practice, supra note 4, at 113.
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swift military action at the direction of Haile Selassie." In addition, Haile
Selassie used force to retain Ethiopia's outer territories after they were
challenged by Somalia and the Sudan.5
C. The Mengistu Era
Although Haile Selassie was successful in defending Ethiopia's
borders, his neglect of internal crises, such as the great inequality in the
distribution of wealth and widespread political corruption, led to his
downfall during the 1970's. 9 In 1974, students, workers, and soldiers
began a series of strikes and demonstrations that culminated on September
12, 1974, with the deposition of Haile Selassie by members of his own
armed forces. 60 The following year, monarchal rule in Ethiopia ended and
was replaced by a socialist-military form of government known as the
Derg.6  Mengistu Haile Mariam, a former major in Haile Selassie's
military, was named Chairman of the Derg.62
Initially, the overthrow of the monarchy and the creation of a socialist
republic ushered in a new era of political openness in Ethiopia. Ethnic
groups that had been brought into the Ethiopian Empire during the 19th and
20th centuries, such as the Tigrayans, Oromos, Afars, Sidama, Ethio-
Somalis, and Eritreans, increased their demands for self-determination.63
Several of these groups even questioned the legitimacy of the Ethiopian
state, and created guerrilla forces to fight for independence. 64 With the
liberalization of politics, several ideologically based political organizations
formed, each with its own view as to the preferred character of a new
Ethiopia. One such group, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (or
"TPLF"), formed in late 1975.65 According to the TPLF's manifesto
"Republic of Greater Tigrai," the organization was founded with the
purpose of expanding the borders of Tigray within Ethiopia and "liberating"
the region from Ethiopian rule.66  The TPLF and other regional
57 See A Prima Facie Case, supra note 8, at 180-182.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 181; see also The 1991 Transitional Charter, supra notel, at 372-375.
60 See The 1991 Transitional Charter, supra notel, at 375.
61 Id. at 375-376
62 See A Regained Interest, supra note 44, at 40.
63 See generally Asafa Jalata, The Emergence of Oromo Nationalism and Ethiopian
Reaction, in OROMo NATIONALISM AND THE ETHIOPIAN DISCOURSE: THE SEARCH FOR
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY 1, 1-23, 10 (Asafa Jalata ed., 1998) [hereinafter Oromo
Nationalism].
64 See generally The 1991 Transitional Charter, supra note 1.
65 Id. at 377.
66 The Manifesto of the TPLF, supra note 14.
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67organizations called for greater representation in Ethiopia's government.
However, rather than allow for democratic elections, the military regime
attempted to co-opt potential opponents by giving the most significant
political organizations representation in Ethiopia's deliberative body, the
Politburo.68
It soon became clear to independence-minded minority political
organizations that Mengistu had no intention of allowing Ethiopia to break
apart.69 Despite their representation in the Politburo, regional political
bodies like the TPLF were often frustrated and pre-empted by Ethiopian
military forces loyal to the Derg.70 By 1977, Mengistu's chief opposition,
the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (or "EPRP"), began waging
guerrilla warfare against the Derg. In a period known as the "White
Terror," the EPRP launched systematic attacks designed to undermine the
military rule of the Derg.72 The Government responded with its own
campaign known as the "Red Terror.",73 During this period, the military
government supplied loyal peasants and workers with weapons and told
them to root out so-called "enemies of the revolution." 74 Between 1977 and
1978, countless numbers of Ethiopians deemed threats to the government
were killed or disappeared as a result of the Red Terror.75
D. The Revolutionary Era
Although the Red Terror forced most of the Ethiopian independence
movements underground, by 1987, they had begun to reemerge as
revitalized and better organized military forces.76 The EPRP, the Eritrean
People's Liberation Front (or "EPLF"), and the Tigray People's Liberation
Front (or "TPLF") waged increasingly successful military campaigns
against the Derg. Over the next two years, the Ethiopian army suffered a
series of defeats and became demoralized.77 The EPLF was able to reclaim
67 See A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 2 at 60-62.
68 Id. at 263.
69 See generally id.
70 Id. at 237.
71 Id. at 58.
72 Id.
73 id.
14 Id. at 58-59 & 237.
75 See id at 327 (Amnesty International concluded that the Red Terror resulted in several
thousand to perhaps tens of thousands of people killed, tortured, and imprisoned. Other
sources estimate that during that time about 30,000 people perished as a result of the Red
Terror and harsh conditions in prisons and concentration camps).
76 See generally id. at 60-62.
77 See id. at 64-65.
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most of Eritrea and TPLF forces occupied most of the Tigray region. By
1991, a new umbrella organization known as the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (or "EPRDF"), which was led by the
Tigray tribe and the TPLF, had encircled the capital city of Addis Ababa.78
The Ethiopian army lost its will to fight and political leaders conceded
defeat. By May of 1991, the EPLF had completely taken over Eritrea,
Mengistu had fled the country, and the EPRDF had taken over Addis
Ababa. 79
By late 1991, the EPRDF, led by Meles Zenawi, had established a
transitional government in Addis Ababa. Zenawi, of both Tigrayan and
Eritrean dissent, had forged an alliance between the TPLF/EPRDF and the
EPLF leading up to the 1991 revolution. 80 Following the revolution, the
EPLF organized a referendum asserting Eritrea's independence. The
referendum passed by an overwhelming majority.81  Ethiopia's new
government did not contest Eritrea's independence, and in 1992, the United
Nations recognized Eritrea as a sovereign nation.82 It seems likely that
Ethiopia allowed Eritrea to secede as a condition of the pre-Revolution
alliance between the TPLF/EPRDF and the EPLF.83
Following its accent to power, the Tigray-led EPRDF welcomed other
regional revolutionary groups to discussions on how to structure Ethiopia's
new government.84  This was an era of revived optimism for smaller
liberation organizations such as the Oromo Liberation Front (or "OLF"),
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (or "ONLF"), and representatives
from other minority populations such as the Sidama and the Afar.
85
78 Id. at 307 & 309.
791 Id. at 309-310.
80 See generally id. 307-3 10.
81 See Principle and Practice, supra note 4, at 119.
821d. at 120.
83 The EPLF initially aided the TPLF because they viewed Tigray as a "buffer" region
between Eritrea and the central government in Ethiopia. However, it also knew that the
TPLF would control Ethiopian politics if the EPRDF defeated the Derg. In its infancy, the
TPLF had few weapons and little money. Given the EPLF's superior bargaining position, it
seems plausible that the EPLF aided the TPLF on the condition that the TPLF would not
later challenge Eritrea's secession once it came to power. See generally A COUNTRY STUDY,
supra note 2 at 307-3 10.
84 See Principle and Practice, supra note 4, at 120-121.
85 See, e.g., The TPLF Ethiopia, supra note 7; see also Ogaden Online Background, supra
note 28 and Hameso, Seyoum and Tilahun Ayanou Nebo, Ethiopia: A New Start?, The
Sidama Concern (2000) (book review), at http://www.sidamaconcem.com/books/
ethiopiaa-new-start.html [hereinafter The Sidama Concern].
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E. The 1994 Constitution
The transitional government ratified Ethiopia's new Constitution in
1994.86 The Constitution, which renamed the country "The Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia," organizes Ethiopia into a federal system
comprised of nine member states delineated according to historical,
cultural, and geographic boundaries.87  The Constitution's most
controversial provision, Article 39, Chapter 1, provides that "every Nation,
Nationality, and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-
determination, including the right to secession.' 88
F. Recent Developments
In 1998, a border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea erupted at the
city of Badme. 89  This dispute revitalized regional calls for self-
determination in Ethiopia. Disgruntled minority leaders see Eritrea's
secession as an example to follow.90 In their view, if Eritrea had a valid
claim to secession and independence, then regions like Oromia and Ogaden
should have a similarly valid claim.91 Article 39 of Ethiopia's 1994
Constitution only adds fuel to this fire. Under Article 39, local
governments have an "unconditional" right to secede. The TPLF/EPRDF
has given only lip-service to its own Constitution, frustrating regional
attempts at independence.92  As the next section will indicate, the
TPLF/EPRDF has used manipulation and intimidation to control the federal
government, creating an atmosphere rich in distrust and ripe for
revolutionary warfare.
11. The TPLF/EPRDF and Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution
Ethiopia's regional populations have grown increasingly dissatisfied
with the EPRDF's implementation of the new Ethiopian government.93
Many see the EPRDF as a front for the TPLF and the Tigray people
generally, and see the supposedly federal form of government as a mask for
86 See discussion of Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution infra Part II.
87 See ETH. CONST. arts. 1, 47.
88 Id. at art. 39.
89 See discussion of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea infra Part III.C.
90 See, e.g., Oromo Nationalism, supra note 63, at 17.
91 Id.
92 See generally id.
93 See, e.g., The TPLF Ethiopia, supra note 7; see also Ogaden Online Background, supra
note 28.
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Tigray's suppression of other cultural minorities. 94 Supposedly democratic
elections have been marred by accusations of intimidation and under-
handed politics. 95  The TPLF/EPRDF has created its own satellite
organizations within minority regions in order to undermine growing calls
for enforcement of the self-determination clause.96
Throughout Ethiopia's history, various central governments have
suppressed regional and cultural nationalism.97  Under Haile Selassie,
members of the Amhara tribe dominated national politics. 98 During the
Mengistu regime, the socialist-military government suppressed ideological
factionalism in the interest of strengthening the nation-state. 99 Although the
Derg was comprised of members from many different tribes, the central
government did not allow for self-government by local communities. 00
The 1991 Revolution led to a period of renewed optimism for minority
populations in Ethiopia.'01  However, this optimism was short-lived.
Although the 1994 Constitution supposedly grants every "Nation,
Nationality, and Peoples" the "unconditional" right to self-determination,
including the right to secede, the TPLF/EPRDF has used various means to
frustrate the enforcement of that right.10 2 Although the Tigray make up
only 5% of Ethiopia's population, TPLF/EPRDF members now hold more
than ninety percent of the seats in the national parliament. 103 It seems likely
that the TPLF/EPRDF, like the Derg before it, never had any intention of
allowing other regions to secede from Ethiopia.
A. Legal Rights under Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution
Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution seems to reflect the renewed optimism
and inclusiveness of the regional governments who participated in its
94 See generally Leenco Lata, The Making and Unmaking of Ethiopia's Transitional
Charter, in OROMO NATIONALISM AND THE ETHIOPIAN DISCOURSE: THE SEARCH FOR
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY, 51, 63, 71-73 (Asafa Jalata ed., 1998) [hereinafter Making and
Unmaking].
95 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2001: ETHIOPIA (2001), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/index.html [hereinafter Al REPORT 2001].
96 See, e.g., Oromo Nationalism, supra note 63, at 14.
97 See discussion supra Part I.
98 See discussion supra Part I.B.
99 See discussion supra Part I.C.
1oo See A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 2 at 58-59 & 111.
101 See, e.g., The TPLF Ethiopia, supra note 7; see also Ogaden Online Background,
supra note 28 and The Sidama Concern, supra note 85.
102 See, e.g., Oromo Nationalism, supra note 63.
103 See AI REPORT 2001, supra note 95.
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drafting.' 0 4  The strength of regional governments under the 1994
Constitution is evident from the first words of its Preamble, which provides:
"We, the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia: Strongly
committed, in full and free exercise of our right to self-determination,
[create this Constitution]."' 0 5  The Preamble also recognizes historical
inequities under previous governments, stating "[we are f]ully cognizant
that our common destiny can best be served by rectifying historical unjust
relationships and by further promoting our shared interests[.]'' 10 6 As this
conciliatory language indicates, the 1994 Constitution allegedly rectifies
past injustices by permitting the people of Ethiopia greater participation in
national decision-making, while simultaneously preserving individual,
group, and national identity.
In Chapter One, the 1994 Constitution establishes a "Federal and
Democratic State structure. 0 07 As such, it gives great deference to the will
of the people. In recognition of the fact that Ethiopia is a diverse nation
with many cultures, Article 5 of Chapter One provides that "[a]ll Ethiopian
languages shall enjoy equal state recognition... [although] Amharic shall
be the working language of the Federal Government. '" Furthermore,
Article 25 prohibits discrimination against any person on the basis of "race,
nation, nationality, or other social origin, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, property, birth, or status.,' 0 9
Part Two within Chapter Three of the 1994 Constitution is entitled
"Democratic Rights." 110 Under Article 29 of that Part, "[ejverone has the
right to freedom of expression without any interference. '  In addition,
"[f]reedom of the press and other mass media ... is guaranteed." ' 1 2 The
right of all Ethiopians to vote in democratic elections "at any level of
government" and to "take part in the conduct of public affairs" is
established in Article 38.113 Article 38 provides that "elections shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing
the free expression of the will of the electors.
'
'
14
1on See generally A Prima Facie Case, supra note 8, at 182-185.
105 ETH. CONST. pmbl.
106 Id. [emphasis added].
10 7 Id. art. 1.
108 Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 25.
"
0 Id. chap. 3, pt. 2.
1" Id. art. 29 2. [emphasis added].
121d art. 29, 3.
1' Id. art. 38.
1141id.
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The most provocative and controversial section of the 1994
Constitution is Article 39, entitled "Rights of Nations, Nationalities, and
Peoples."' 15 Because this Article of the Constitution is particularly relevant
to the present crisis in Ethiopia, it requires more in-depth analysis. The
Constitution recognizes the states of Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia,
Somalia, Benshangul/Gumuz, the State of the Southern Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples (including the Sidama), Gambela, and Harari.
16
In addition, the Constitution provides procedures for other "Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples" to organize into a new state under certain
circumstances. "1
7
The first three paragraphs of Article 39 state that "[e]very Nation,
Nationality and People in Ethiopia" has: 1) "an unconditional right to self-
determination, including the right to secession[,]" 2) "the right to speak, to
write, and to develop its own language; to express, to develop, and to
promote its culture, and preserve its history[,]" and 3) "the right to a full
measure of self-government which includes the right to establish
institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable
representation in state and Federal governments." 18
Of the rights granted to all "Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples" under
Article 39, the unconditional right to secede has been the source of the most
controversy. As previously noted, scholars have assumed that this
provision of the 1994 Constitution reflects a compromise made as a part of
the uneasy alliance between Ethiopia's regional opposition groups and the
Tigray-led EPRDF.'9 Under this assumption, following the 1991 coup, the
void left by the Derg left many regional groups clamoring for power over
Ethiopia's central government. 120  Eritrea's secession in 1992 further
escalated tensions by inspiring regional governments to seek their own
sovereignty as minority populations questioned the very existence of the
Ethiopian state. 2 ' Thus, the right of secession enshrined in Article 39 can
be seen as a compromise made by the EPRDF in order to legitimize its
power over Ethiopia and quell tensions with other regional groups.
122
However, for reasons set forth in the next section, this assumption, although
widely held, is probably politically accurate, but practically shortsighted
and dangerously naive.
115 Id. art. 39.
116 Id, chap. 4, art. 47.
17id.
"
8 Id. art. 39.
1 9 See, e.g., The TPLF Ethiopia, supra note 7.
120 id.
121 See, e.g., Oromo Nationalism, supra note 63, at 17.
122 See, e.g., The TPLF Ethiopia, supra note 7.
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Article 39 also sets forth the procedures by which regional states can
exercise their rights to self-determination and secession. Under Section
Four of Article 39, a region may secede when 1) "a demand for secession
has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the
Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality, or People concerned;" 2)
"the Federal Government has organized a referendum which must take
place within three years from the time it received the concerned council's
decision for secession;" 3) "the demand for secession is supported by a
majority vote in the referendum;" 4) "the Federal Government will have
transferred its powers to the council of the Nation, Nationality, or People
who has voted to secede;" and 5) "the division of assets is effected in a
manner prescribed by law."''
23
Under comparative analysis, the procedural requirements for secession
under Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution are strikingly minimal. No other nation
has adopted such a lenient view regarding the secession of its member
states. 12  On its face, Ethiopia's Constitution ignores grave risks and
guarantees rights "unprecedented in the history of nation states.' 25
B. The Suppression of Minority Rights by the TPLF/EPRDF
One might wonder if so many cultural and regional minorities are
unhappy with the new government, and the procedural requirements for
secession are so minimal, why no regions other than Eritrea have
successfully seceded from Ethiopia. The answer lies in the fact that the
Tigray-led EPRDF has undermined its own Constitution through violence,
intimidation, and political influence in order to prevent regional
governments from exercising their self-determination rights under Article
39.126
123 ETH. CONST. art. 39.
124 See Principle and Practice, supra note 4, at 125.
125 Id. at 128, quoting Paul H. Brietske, Ethiopia's Leap in the Dark: Federalism and Self-
Determination in the New Constitution, 39 J. AFR. L. 1, 32 (1995).
126 Minority populations within Ethiopia have been able to present their views and
concerns to the global forum with the advent of the Internet. However, because of its
subjective nature, the anecdotal evidence contained in this section should be analyzed with
heightened scrutiny. Although many cultural minorities in Ethiopia have suffered under the
rule of the TPLF/EPRDF, this section will focus on the struggles of the Oromo and the
Ethio-Somalis living in the Ogaden region.
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1. The Oromo
Throughout Ethiopia's history, no other tribal population has been
more oppressed and marginalized than the Oromo. 12  Inhabiting the
majority of southern Ethiopia, Oromos are the largest ethno-national group
in Ethiopia, comprising over sixty percent of the country's population.
1 8
Oromos have been continually subjugated and impoverished by Ethiopian
central governments that have deprived them of education, economic
resources, and cultural identity.' 29  During the 1960's, an Oromo-
nationalism movement known as the Oromo Liberation Front (or "OLF")
formed to address concerns of the Oromo people in Ethiopian society.
13
Although the OLF was forced underground during the reign of the Derg, it
emerged again in the early 1990's. As an alleged gesture of national unity,
in 1991 the EPRDF invited representatives of the OLF to participate in the
drafting of Ethiopia's new Constitution.131
Although initially optimistic, the OLF has grown increasingly
dissatisfied with the EPRDF. 132 Oromos argue that the EPRDF is nothing
but a front for the TPLF and the Tigray people generally. 33 Under this
view, the Tigray have simply taken the place of the Amhara as the tribal
dictators of Ethiopia.' 
34
Since Ethiopia's 1991 revolution, the EPRDF has inhibited Oromo
nationalism in several ways. For example, the EPRDF created the Oromo
People's Democratic Organization (or "OPDO") in order to diffuse support
for the OLF and weaken the push for Oromo independence.' The OPDO,
considered by the OLF to be a "puppet organization,'1 36 was created from
Ethiopian war prisoners captured in Eritrea and Tigray during the 1991
Revolution. 37 While the OPDO supports national unity in Ethiopia, most
127 See Human Waves, supra note 26.
128 See generally Asafa Jalata, Preface, in OROMO NATIONALISM AND THE ETHIOPIAN
DISCOURSE: THE SEARCH FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY, i-xii, at ix-x, (Asafa Jalata ed.,
1998).
129 id.
130 See Oromo Nationalism, supra note 63, at 11.
131 Id. at 12-13.
132 See generally id.; see also The TPLF Ethiopia, supra note 7.
133 See generally Oromo Nationalism, supra note 63.
134 id.
131 ld. at 14.
136 id.
137 id.
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Oromo reject the group, calling it maxanee, which means "an organization
that does not have its own existence."'' 38
According to the OLF, the TPLF/EPRDF supplied members of the
OPDO with campaign funds leading up to regional elections in June of
1992.139 Thereafter, members of the OLF withdrew from the elections on
the grounds that democracy was being undermined by the Tigrayan-
dominated regime. 14 As a result, Oromia's regional government was filled
with OPDO members who supported the EPRDF. These officials, in turn,
elected pro-EPRDF representatives to Ethiopia's federal government. 141
Seeing their hopes for democratic reform systematically undermined
by the TPLF/EPRDF, the OLF once again began striving for Oromo
independence through guerilla warfare. 142 To discourage Oromo citizens
from joining the liberation movement, the EPRDF allegedly "murdered
thousands of Oromos and created several concentration-type camps at
Hurso (Hararghe), Didesa (Wallaga), and Bilate (Sidamo) . . . where it
practices ethnic cleansing."
1 3
2. Ethio-Somalis living in the Ogaden
The Ogaden is a hotly contested region between the south-eastern
border of Ethiopia and the north-western border of Somalia. 144 Between
1948 and 1955, Britain, who held a colonial claim over the region, ceded
large portions of the Ogaden to Ethiopia.1 45 During this period, Ethiopian
occupation forces killed more than one hundred residents of the Ogaden
and implemented the policy of "Amharatization" at the direction of Haile
Selassie.146 Under Mengistu, the Derg transferred thousands of Ethiopian
settlers to the Ogaden in an attempt to change the demographic make-up of
the region. 47 By making the Somali-born indigenous inhabitants of the
Ogaden a politically insignificant minority, Mengistu suppressed the push
for an Ogadeni national identity and brought the Ogaden under Ethiopian
control. 148
138 id.
39 See id. at 14-16.
140 id,
141 Id. at 15.
1421d. at 16.
431 Id. at 17.
'44 See 1990 Relief Map of Ethiopia in Appendix 4.
145 See Ogaden Online Background, supra note 28.
146 Id. See A Prima Facie Case, supra note 8, at 180-182.
147 Ogaden Online Background, supra note 28.
148 id.
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When the TPLF/EPRDF came to power in 1991, indigenous residents
of the Ogaden initially welcomed Ethiopia's new Charter and embraced the
new government's policy of supposedly uninhibited self-determination.
1 49
The Ogaden National Liberation Front (or "ONLF"), the vanguard of the
Ogaden people's long struggle against Ethiopian occupation, decided
unequivocally to be a part of the new political process in Ethiopia by
ratifying the new Charter and Constitution. 150 The EPRDF's promises of
inclusiveness and democracy led to a period of renewed optimism for
residents of the Ogaden and the ONLF.1
51
Ogadeni optimism was short-lived. Like the Oromo, Ogadenis quickly
learned that the EPRDF had no intention of allowing the Ogaden Regional
Parliament to exercise the self-determination rights supposedly guaranteed
by Article 39.152 In 1992, the ONLF accused the TPLF/EPRDF of
masterminding the killings of several ONLF officials, including some
members belonging to the Front's Central Committee. 153 In September of
1992, the Ogaden people went to the polls to elect regional representatives.
Unlike the Oromo and the OLF, Ogadeni candidates were not opposed by
EPRDF-backed candidates. 54 As a result, ONLF members were elected to
roughly eighty-four percent of the seats in the Ogaden Regional
Parliament.
However, the EPRDF soon employed tactics to limit the effectiveness
of the new local government of the Ogaden. In mid-1993, the Ogaden
regional government accused the central government in Addis Ababa of
"flagrant interference" in the day-to-day affairs of the Ogaden region.156 In
addition, the EPRDF allegedly deprived the Ogaden region of its share of
the central budget and aid from the international community. 157 Tensions in
the region escalated when Ethiopian security forces arrested the President,
Vice-President, and Secretary of the Ogaden Regional Assembly in late-
1993.158 They were released from prison ten months later without ever
having been charged or tried. 5 9
149 id.
151 Id.
152 See generally id.
153 Id.
114 See id.
I5 id.
156 Id.
157 id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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On January 28, 1994, the ONLF called for a referendum on self-
determination and independence for the Ogaden at a press conference in
Addis Ababa.1 60 The TPFL/EPRDF responded to the press conference both
quickly and violently. On February 22, 1994, more than 81 unarmed
Ogadeni protestors were allegedly massacred by TPLF militias in the
Ogaden town of Wardheer 61  On April 17, 1994, the TPLF/EPRDF
launched a large-scale military offensive against ONLF positions and
arrested many suspected supporters of the ONLF.1
62
In May of 1994, the Ogaden Regional Assembly passed a unanimous
resolution demanding a referendum on self-determination and
independence for the Ogaden people in accordance with Article 39 of
Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution. 3  The central government reacted by
overthrowing and virtually disbanding all democratically elected national
institutions in the Ogaden, including the Regional Parliament.'64 Later that
same year, the EPRDF sponsored a new satellite party in the Ogaden called
the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (or "ESDL"). Like the OPDO in
Oromia, the ESDL is seen by local residents of the Ogaden as a puppet
organization implemented by the EPRDF in order to undermine the local
push for self-determination. 15
C. Recent Oppressive Acts by the TPLF/EPRDF
The struggles for independence and self-determination of the Oromo
and the Ogadeni people continue today.166  Other smaller regional
populations within Ethiopia, such as the Sidama, the Afar, and the Amhara,
also continue to be oppressed by the Tigray and the EPRDF-dominated
central government. 167 According to recent Amnesty International reports,
clashes between EPRDF forces and rebels from both the OLF and ONLF
have resulted in numerous human rights violations, mainly by government
troops against civilians accused of supporting the rebels.168
160 id.
161 id.
162 id.
163 id.
1641id.
165 Id.
166 See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2002: ETHIOPIA (2002),
available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/afr/ethiopia?Open [hereinafter Al
REPORT 2002] (explaining that governments in both regions have continued to face armed
opposition).
167 See generally id.
168 Id.
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In May of 2000, nation-wide elections were held for seats in national
and regional parliaments.' 69 More than 50 political parties took part in the
elections, including 23 opposition parties. 7 International observers were
banned from monitoring the elections by the EPRDF. 171 According to
Amnesty International, there were many claims by opposition parties of
government repression and intimidation during voter registration and
campaigning, particularly in Ethiopia's Southern region.' 72  Several
opposition parties complained of supporters being beaten and detained,
offices being closed, candidates being prevented from registering, and
opposition party supporters being dismissed from government jobs.173
There were many reports of civilians being shot dead by police at voting
locations throughout Ethiopia on Election Day.
17 4
Not surprisingly, despite nationwide opposition, the EPRDF coalition
led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's Tigray People's Liberation Front
won more than ninety percent of the seats in both national and regional
parliaments. 175 In October of 2000, the "new" government, again headed
by Meles Zenawi, was sworn in.
176
On April 10, 2001, police violently dispersed students at Addis Ababa
University who were peacefully protesting on their campus against EPRDF-
imposed restrictions on their academic freedoms. 177 Over forty students
were injured and the situation on campus remained tense during the
following week, and on April 17, police ordered students to return to their
classes or face expulsion. 78  According to reports, supporters of the
students began throwing rocks at the police. 79 The police responded with
live ammunition.' 8 ° In the two days of rioting that ensued, at least 31
people were killed.' 81 Around three thousand people, including students,
opposition party members, and human rights activists were arrested and
held without trial following the riots. 182
169 AI REPORT 2001, supra note 95.
170 Id.
171 id.
172 Id.
173 id.
174 id.
175 id.
176 id.
177 Al REPORT 2002, supra note 166.
17 8 id.
179 id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 id.
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Following the riots, the TPLF arrested Mesfin Wolde Mariam, former
Secretary General of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (or "EHRCO"),
in Addis Ababa on May 8, 2001.183 He was charged with "organizing
[himself] under an underground political party... with a view to changing
the Constitution through illegal means" and "incitement to violence." 184
Mariam's arrest symbolizes the increasing brashness of Ethiopia's
central government. The push for literal enforcement of the 1994
Constitution, especially Article 39, is growing. Regional populations are
striving towards referendums declaring their self-determination and
independence from Ethiopia. The more opposition groups criticize the
central government, the more the EPRDF responds with violence and
underhanded politics. As a result of this violence, Ethiopia faces potential
Balkanization, either through force or international intervention.
I1. Evidence of the TPLF's Hidden Agenda
The TPLF/EPRDF's violent clashes with the OLF and the ONLF
demonstrate that Ethiopia's central government has no intention of allowing
Oromia or the Ogaden to secede. In light of this fact, one might ask why
the TPLF/EPRDF granted regional governments the 'unconditional' right to
secede in Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution. The answer is simple. The
TPLF/EPRDF enshrined the right of secession in their Constitution so that
the TPLF could use Ethiopian resources to develop and expand the
province of Tigray, and then secede themselves.
For obvious reasons, direct evidence of the TPLF's hidden agenda is
difficult to find. However, circumstantial and anecdotal evidence abounds
suggesting that the TPLF is secretly attempting to loot Ethiopia. This
evidence comes from three main sources: 1) the 1976 TPLF manifesto
known as the "Republic of Greater Tigrai," 2) the economic development
that has taken place in Tigray since the 1991 Revolution, and 3) the
implications of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
A. The "Republic of Greater Tigrai"
The most compelling evidence of the TPLF's hidden agenda comes
from the organization's own manifesto, the "Republic of Greater Tigrai."
In the mid-1970's, a small group of Tigrayan dissidents formed the Tigray
People's Liberation Front (or "TPLF") in order to liberate the Tigray region
from Ethiopia's socialist-military government. 185 In 1976, TPLF leaders
183 Id.
184id
185 See generally Who Benefits, supra note 13; The Manifesto of the TPLF, supra note 14;
and Human Waves, supra note 26.
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spelled out their long-term plan in the group's manifesto. 1 86 This plan
consists of two main parts, 1) annexing lands within Ethiopia to expand the
borders of Tigray, and 2) acquiring access to the Red Sea through the
Eritrean port-city of Assab.' 87 The plan culminates in Tigray's secession
from Ethiopia.' 8  Interestingly, Meles Zenawi, the former Secretary
General of the TPLF and the current Prime Minister of Ethiopia, has never
formally repudiated the "Republic of Greater Tigrai," or its secessionist
goals.' 8
9
One way the "Republic of Greater Tigrai" aims to expand the borders
of Tigray is by redefining who qualifies as a citizen of Tigray. According
to the manifesto, a Tigrayan is defined as any person who speaks the Tigray
language of "Tigigna," including those that live outside the borders of
Tigray-proper. 190  Many Ethiopian tribes that neighbor Tigray speak
dialects of Tigigna, including the Kunamas, the Sahos, the Afar, the
Agnew, and the Welkait. 191 Thus, under the TPLF's manifesto, lands these
tribes occupy will be "liberated" from Ethiopia as parts of "Greater
Tigrai.' 192 Furthermore, the manifesto delineates the borders of "Greater
Tigrai" to include lands to the West inside of Gondar, lands to the South
inside of Wollo, and lands to East inside the Eritrean regions of Burie and
the port city of Assab, formerly occupied by the Afar.193
Since the TPLF/EPRDF took control of Ethiopia in 1991, Tigray has
successfully annexed lands from Wollo and Gondar in accordance with the
TPLF manifesto.1 94 Th¢se annexations received little fanfare because the
regions are inhabited primarily by poor farmers and the TPLF dominates
local politics. 95 Furthermore, the EPRDF produced maps in 1997 that
seemed to expand the territorial holdings of Tigray. Specifically, Ethiopian
administrative maps show an "enlarged" Tigray that borders the Sudan and
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 See Human Waves, supra note26.
190 See Mebrat Tzehale, Background to the Current Border Dispute Between Eritrea and
Ethiopia (2000), available at http://home.planet.nl/-hans.mebrat/eritrea-ethiopia.htm
[hereinafter Background to the Current Border Dispute].
191 Id.
192 See generally Who Benefits, supra note 13; The Manifesto of the TPLF, supra note 14;
and Human Waves, supra note 26.
193 See Hidden Agendas, supra note 18.
194 Sdr
195 See Who Benefits, supra 6ote 13.
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incorporates land within Eritrea.196 Interestingly, this enlarged map also
appears on new versions of Ethiopia's paper currency, the Birr.197
The enlarged 1997 maps did not go unnoticed by Eritreans. A popular
joke even surfaced in Eritrea on the subject: An Eritrean asks a Tigrayan
where the city of Badme is located. The Tigrayan pulls out a map that
shows Badme as a part of Ethiopia. Surprised, the Eritrean remarks, "But I
thought Badme was in Eritrea!?" To which the Tigrayan replies, "Oh, I'm
sorry. This is next year's map."' 98 Any humor Eritreans may have found in
this joke quickly vanished the following year when the border dispute with
Ethiopia erupted at Badme.' 99
B. Economic Development in Tigray Since 1991
Tigray has changed significantly since the 1991 Revolution. Before
the Revolution, Tigray was economically limited and relatively
undeveloped. °°  Since the Revolution, Tigray has experienced vast
economic and commercial growth. After coming to power, the EPRDF
established several economic programs to benefit Tigray with Ethiopian
money.201  Through these "post-war rebuilding programs," the
TPLF/EPRDF has diverted large quantities of Ethiopian government
resources to Tigray.2°2 In addition, by declaring itself to be a democracy,
the central government has been able to obtain large amounts of
international aid for Ethiopia.2 °3 Some observers suspect that aid meant to
prevent famine has been diverted to TPLF-affiliated programs.20 4 While
these allegations have yet to been proved, one fact is clear: Tigray has
experienced radical commercial growth while other regions of Ethiopia
have stagnated.20 5
Shortly after coming to power, the TPLF/EPRDF established
Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (or "EFFORT") with the
purported purpose of rebuilding Tigray in the wake of the 1991
Revolution. 206 EFFORT was funded with a substantial amount of Ethiopian
196 See Hidden Agendas, supra note 18.
197 Id. See also the picture of a modem Birr in Appendix 5.
198 See Hidden Agendas, supra note 18.
199 See id
200 See Who Benefits, supra note 13.
201 Id.
202 id.
203 See, e.g., Ethiopia Fact Sheet, supra note 29.
204 See, e.g., Hidden Agendas, supra note 18.
205 See, e.g., Ogaden Online Background, supra note 28.
206 See Post-Revolutionary Tigray, supra note 17, at 85.
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capital garnered from several sources, including: non-military equipment
captured from the Derg, money from private and public Ethiopian
companies, financial contributions of Non-governmental Organizations !or
"NGO's"), and money borrowed from the state-owned banks of Ethiopia. 07
Money supplied through EFFORT has allowed the TPLF to develop
Tigray's cities far beyond where they were before the 1991 Revolution.
2 8
Some of the projects the TPLF has funded through EFFORT include a
marble quarry at Sheraro, a pharmaceutical firm at Adigrat, textile and
clothing workshops at Aduwa, an industrial plant to produce cement in the
capital city of Mekelle, and "Guna," a sizeable and diversified enterprise
which provides loans, seeds, and tractors to farmers in the commercially-
significant region of Humera.2 °9
In addition to EFFORT, several other NGO's facilitate the economic
advantage that Tigray holds over other regions of Ethiopia. These include
the Relief Society of Tigray (or "REST"), initially established by the TPLF
during the course of the 1991 Revolution, and the Tigray Development
Association (or "TDA"), another NGO with a close relationship to the
TPLF. 210  These organizations have an increasing involvement in the
commercial sector, for example, REST operates a bus service, while the
TDA has become, inter alia, the owner of a travel agency based in Addis
Ababa.21'
The diversion of Ethiopian resources to Tigray is not limited to NGOs.
Other expensive projects proceeding in Tigray are not directly traceable to
an NGO or the TPLF/EPRDF, but seem suspect given the troubled state of
the Ethiopian economy.2 12 For example, three colleges have been built in
Tigray's capital city of Makalle: a business school, a medical school, and an
engineering school.213 In addition, luxurious hotels have been constructed
in Tigray cities like Axun. 2 14  Furthermore, multiple high-rise office
buildings have been constructed in Tigrayan urban centers.21 5 Interestingly,
many of these buildings remain empty.2' Some critics have speculated that
207 Id,
208 See Hidden Agendas, supra note 18.
209 See Post-Revolutionary Tigray, supra note 17, at 85-86.
2 10 Id. at 86.
211 id.
212 See generally Ethiopia: Focus on cycle of poverty, U.N. OCHA INTEGRATED REGIONAL
INFORMATION NETWORK ("IRIN"), (2002), available at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/
w/rwb.nsfY [hereinafter Cycle of Poverty].
213 See The Manifesto of the TPLF, supra note 14.
2141id
215 id
216 id
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the TPLF intends these buildings to be the future centers of Tigrayan
business once the region secedes from Ethiopia. 17
In addition to diverting money from the rest of Ethiopia to Tigray,international aid organizations suspect that the TPLF has also
misappropriated donated monies.21 8 Since overthrowing the socialist Derg,
the ostensibly-democratic EPRDF has been able to secure large amounts of
aid from Western nations such as the United States.219 According to theinternational advocacy group Human Rights Watch (or "HRW"), Western
nations have "poured in funding to help the country develop, but turned ablind eye to human rights violations . . . not wishing to jeopardize
Ethiopia's cooperation in fighting terrorism.,, 220 Furthermore, according toUN documents, "[t]he poor in Ethiopia are getting poorer despite billions ofdollars of aid., 221 As a result, food aid and its effectiveness have also come
under the close scrutiny of the UN's Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (or
"EUE). The EUE suggests that checks must beput in place to ensure. ,,2222
that aid is delivered on time and to the right people.22
By all accounts, Ethiopia is a country in economic crisis.224 Ethiopia'stwo-year border dispute with Eritrea (discussed below) cost the country an
estimated $1 Million (US) per day. 25 The country's financial debt is
staggering. As of November, 2002, Ethiopia owed the rest of the world
around $6 Billion (US), the equivalent of Ethiopia's entire gross domesticproduct.226 Given Ethiopia's debt and growing famine crisis, Tigray's
recent development seems particularly suspect. In light of the foregoing
analysis, it seems plausible that the TPLF diverts borrowed money andinternational aid to Tigray because it believes Tigray will be able to leave
the rest of Ethiopia with the bill when it secedes.
217 See, e.g., id.
218 See generally Cycle of Poverty, supra note 212.
219 See Ethiopia Fact Sheet, supra note 29.
220 Eritrea-Ethiopia: Rights Group says Border Ruling "Favourable " to Eritrea, U.N.
OCHA INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK ("IRIN"), (2003), available at
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/ [hereinafter Favorable Ruling].
221 Cycle of Poverty, supra note 212.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Cf. id. (discussing the startling fact that 2.5 million people are at "serious risk" of
destitution).
225 Id.
226 id.
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C. The Ethiopia - Eritrea Border Dispute
More circumstantial evidence of the TPLF's hidden agenda comes
from the recent border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 1998,
hostilities broke out between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces near the Eritrean
city of Badme.227 Although the TPLF/EPRDF and the EPLF were allies
during the 1991 Revolutibn against the Derg, relations between them had
soured.228 Both sides cited "territorial integrity" as their justification for the
use of force.229 In 2000, both sides agreed to have the border dispute settled
by the United Nations.230  A special commission created to resolve the
dispute handed down its decision in April of 2002.231 This section will
demonstrate how the events leading up to, surrounding, and following the
Ethiopia - Eritrea border dispute shed light on the TPLF's hidden agenda.
The TPLF/EPRDF-led Ethiopian government attacked Eritrea in
furtherance of the TPLF's plan to gain access to the Red Sea for "Greater
Tigrai." A year before overthrowing the Derg, Meles Zenawi, then the
leader of the TPLF, was quoted as saying, "We look to [the independence
of Eritrea] from the viewpoint of the interests of Tigray, first, and then
Ethiopia as a whole. We know that Tigray needs access to the sea and the
only way is through Eritrea.', 232 From this quote one can infer that the
future Prime Minister of Ethiopia was considering challenging the borders
of Eritrea on behalf of the Tigray even before he assumed power over
Ethiopia.
This inference explains why Ethiopia later opened the Burie front near
Eritrea's southernmost port town of Assab. Unlike other areas contested
during the border dispute, Burie had not previously been a source of
conflict. 233 If Ethiopia had succeeded in annexing the Eritrean town of
Burie, it would have cut off Eritrea's access to its port city of Assab.234
Located in the southernmost region of Eritrea,235 Assab would have once
again given Ethiopia access to the Red Sea. In addition, according to the
1976 manifesto, Assab borders certain Ethiopian lands within the borders of
227 See Background to the Current Border Dispute, supra note 190.
228 See Human Waves, supra note 26.
229 See Hidden Agendas, supra note 18.
230 See Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE - Background, U.N. MISSION IN ERITREA AND
ETHIOPIA ("UNMEE") (2002), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unee/
background.html [hereinafter UNMIEE Background].
231 id.
232 Hidden Agendas, supra note 18.
233 Id.
234 See id.
235 See Appendix 2.
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"Greater Tigrai.,236 Thus, it is likely that the Tigrayan leaders of Ethiopia
opened the Burie front in an attempt to capture Assab's Red Sea access for
the benefit of "Greater Tigrai." 2 7
New evidence also suggests that the TPLF/EPRDF committed war
crimes during the border dispute with Eritrea by using peasants from rural
regions of Ethiopia as "human minesweepes.i.2 38  Before the dispute
erupted, Tigrayans made up the overwhelmii4 majority of Ethiopia's
army. 239  With war with Eritrea looming, the Tigrayans mobilized theEthiopian state on their behalf. 240 They "recruited" some 250,000 men
from other regions to join the army. 24 These recruits - mostly rural
farmers with little or no training - fought on Ethiopia's front-line, while
Tigrayans, who made up eighty percent of the army's officers, directed the
battle from the rear. The Ethiopian leadership's strategy for the new
recruits was simple: deploy tens of thousands of them along a 3-mile front,
drive them forward through minefields, and hope that they blow themselves
up in order to clear a path to the Eritrean front line for better trained troops,
mechanized forces, and artillery.243 Recruits who attempted to turn back
were shot by their superiors. 244 This strategy resulted in the slaughter of
many Ethiopians and prompted international outrage.245 A 1999 article in
"The Economist" stated, "[the TPLF/EPRDF] have been prepared to accept
casualty figures that are usually regarded as unacceptable in modern
warfare." 2
46
Ethiopia's strategy did not work. After two years of bloody fighting,
Ethiopia had failed to realize its territorial goals. 247 In 2000, both sides
agreed to have the dispute settled by the United Nations.248 On September
15, 2000, UN Security Council Resolution 1320 established the United
Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (or "UNMEE") to monitor the
ceasefire between the two countries.2 49 In addition, under the auspices of
236 See Human Waves, supra note 26.
237 id.
238 id.
239 id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 id.
243 id.
244 Id.
245 id.
246 Ethiopia and Eritrea: Trench Warfare, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1999, at 58.
247 See Human Waves, supra note 26.
248 S.C. RES. 1320, U.N. SCOR, 4181st mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. E/58366 (2000).
249 Id.
2004]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
the Organization for African Unity (or "OAU"), an agreement between
Eritrea and Ethiopia established the Eritrea - Ethiopia Boundary
Commission (or "EEBC") to resolve the conflict.250 The EEBC handed
down it decision on April 13, 2002.251 In the international advocacy group
Human Rights Watch's (or "HRW") 2003 World Report, the organization
opined that the EEBC "gave a ruling favorable to Eritrea., 252 According to
HRW, "[t]he report [by the EEBC] generally rejected Ethiopia's claims
including (without mentioning it by name) the claim to the village of
Badme where the war had started." 2 5 3 According to diplomatic sources,
Ethiopia is currently preparing a comprehensive legal challenge to the
EEBC ruling.
254
IV. The Legality of Tigray's Potential Secession Based on Self-
determination
Ethiopia's failure to annex Badme and the port city of Assab from
Eritrea may have temporarily thwarted the TPLF's dreams of access to the
Red Sea for "Greater Tigrai." However, the TPLF/EPRDF leadership that
remains in control of Ethiopia may challenge the border with Eritrea again
in the future through legal or military means.255 Alternatively, the TPLF
might decide to assert Tigray's independence from Ethiopia without access
to the Red Sea. In either case, the question remains: could Tigray legally
secede from Ethiopia in the name of self-determination under international
law?
The principle of "self-determination" is one of the most commonly and
passionately expressed concepts in international relations. 256 Yet, it also
has the distinction of being one of international law's most complex and
confusing terms. 257 Ever since the principle was enshrined in the United
Nations Charter, the UN has become the principle venue for claims of self-
determination and defenses to those claims .218 Through a series of UN
250 See UNMEE Background, supra note 230.
251 See Favorable Ruling, supra note 220.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 See generally id.
256 See A Prima Facie Case, supra note 8; see also Legality of Secessions, supra note 52,
at 479.
257 See Self-Determination: Its Evolution, supra note 34, see also A Regained Interest,
supra note 44.
258 Self-Determination: Its Evolution, supra note 34, at 77.
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resolutions, the concept of self-determination has evolved and been
refined.259
In order to understand the concept of self-determination, one musthave a working definition of the term "self."260  In other words, what
constitutes a "people" entitled to the right to self-determination? Who
qualifies as a beneficiary of such a right? What is the prima facie case for
making a claim of self-determination?
A. The Evolution of "Self-Determination" in the United Nations
The concept of "self-determination" gained international legal
recognition when the Great Powers (the United States, the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, France, and China) came together following the end of World
War II to draft the Charter for the United Nations (hereinafter, the
"Charter"). 26 1  Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Charter recognizes "the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 262 Theprinciple is also mentioned in the preamble of Article 55, which deals with
the development of international social and economic cooperation.263
In 1960, the UN approved the Declaration of the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV) (hereinafter "Resolution 1514").26 Although the
title of Resolution 1514 refers to "colonial countries and peoples," the
Declaration has become the springboard for most modem calls for self-
265determination. Indeed, the UN and legal scholars have given the term
"colonial" a broad working definition to include most, if not all countries
and peoples.266 To support this view, some note that Principle 1 of the
Resolution 1514 does not refer explicitly to "colonialism." Rather,
Resolution 1514 prohibits sub ection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination, and exploitation. 26P Furthermore, Principle 2 of Resolution
1514 provides that "[a]ll people have the right to self-determination; by
259 See generally id. (reviewing the norms established by the UN by which claimants to
self-determination can be "judged").
260 See, e.g., Legality of Secessions, supra note 52, at 516-518.
261 Id. at 480.
262 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
263 Id. art. 55.
264 G.A. RES. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960) [hereinafter Resolution 1514].
265 Id.
266 See, e.g., Legality of Secessions, supra note 52, at 516-518.
267 See id.
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virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. '268
Several provisions of Resolution 1514 seem internally inconsistent and
contrary to the UN Charter.269 For example, Principle 4 of Resolution 1514
provides that "[a]ll armed actions or repressive measures of all kinds
directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to
exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the
integrity of their national territory shall be respected., 270  However,
Principle 6 of Resolution 1514 provides that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations. 271  Thus, Resolution 1514 embraces the right of
"dependent peoples" to strive for "complete independence," but
simultaneously prohibits "any attempt" at independence that threatens
"national unity and territorial integrity." Conflict arises over the fact that,
depending on one's point of view, the same act of rebellion can be seen as
both an attempt to gain independence and a threat to national unity. This
conflict is exacerbated by the fact that Resolution 1514 does not define the
word "people. 272
The United Nations Charter embodies the two internationally
recognized rights of self-determination and territorial integrity. In many
ways, Resolution 1514 pits one against the other by begging the question of
which right takes precedent when the two are in conflict. 73 Former UN
Secretary-General U Thant summarized this conflict in 1971 when he
stated; "[A problem] which often confronts us and to which as yet no
acceptable answer has been found in the provisions of the Charter, is the
conflict between the principles of the integrity of sovereign states and the
assertion of the right to self-determination, and even secession, by a large
group within a sovereign state ... [A] dangerous deadlock can paralyze the
ability of the United Nations to help those involved., 274  Thus, while
Resolution 1514 increased the rights of people to self-determination, it
caused definitional problems that still plague the international legal
community.
These definitional problems were revisited, but not resolved, in 1970
when the UN General Assembly passed The Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
268 Resolution 1514, supra note 264.
269 See Self-Determination: Its Evolution, supra note 34, at 87.
270 Resolution 1514, supra note 264, at (4).
271 Id. at (6).
272 See Self-Determination: Its Evolution, supra note 34, at 88.
273 Id. at 89.
274 Id. citing the Introduction to the Report of the United Nations Secretary General, 1971.
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States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nation: GeneralAssembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (hereinafter "Resolution 2625",).27 In
the section entitled "The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-
Determination," Resolution 2625 dictates principles aimed at clarifying
how a people can exercise its rights to self-determination. For example,
Resolution 2625 provides that "[t]he establishment of a sovereign andindependent State, the free association or integration with an independent
State, or the emergence into any other political statusfreely determined by a
people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by
that people. 276
Furthermore, Resolution 2625 provides that people who are forcibly
prohibited from exercising their rights to self-determination can seek
redress from the United Nations. In the same section, Resolution 2625provides that "[e]very state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action
which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present
principles of their right to self-determination and freedom and
independence ... [In such cases] such peoples are entitled to seek and
receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter."277
However, like Resolution 1514, Resolution 2625 fails to reconcile the
conflict between the right to self-determination and the right to nationalintegrity. Resolution 2625 provides that "[n]othing in the foregoing
paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair ... the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination ofpeoples as described above .. . While this principle would seem to
grant the right to self-determination to oppressed minorities within a State,
the lack of a working definition for the term "peoples" weakens theprotection afforded to sub-groups within a sovereign State. Resolution
2625, like Resolution 1514, fails to specify who benefits from the right to
self-determination.280
27' G.A. RES. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) [hereinafter Resolution 2625].
276 Id. [emphasis added].
277 id.
278 See generally Self-Determination: Its Evolution, supra note 34, at 88-91.
279 Resolution 2625, supra note 275.
280 See generally Self-Determination: Its Evolution, supra note 34, at 91.
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B. Defining the Term "Self"
The ambiguity within the various UN Resolutions concerning the
rights of people to govern themselves demonstrates that a working
definition of "self' and "people" is central to any discussion regarding self-
determination. Although the United Nations has failed to supply such a
definition, legal scholars have concluded that the UN Resolutions described
above grant self-determination rights to two groups of people: (1) colonial
peoples; and (2) peoples subjected to "foreign domination. 28 1 Evidence
that the UN grants self-determination rights to colonial peoples comes
from, among other sources, the title of UN Resolution 1514, which
explicitly refers to "colonial countries and peoples. 282  Evidence for
support of the second group, though less obvious than that for colonized
peoples, also comes directly from the text of UN Resolution 1514.
Resolution 1514 expanded the right of self-determination beyond the
classical colonial setting to include struggles against "alien subjugation,
domination, and exploitation.,
283
However, the scope of the second group is less than clear. Many
questions remain unanswered by the texts. What constitutes foreign
"subjugation, domination, and exploitation?" Who is considered "foreign?"
Is the term "foreign" limited to oppressors outside of a recognized State, or
can "foreign" apply to the government within a nation-state who is
geographically, culturally, and politically removed from the local
population it oppresses? In spite of their importance to the case of Ethiopia
and other multi-cultural countries, answers to these questions remain
elusive.
In broad terms, legal scholars use both objective and subjective
approaches in identifying a legitimate "self' for the purpose of defining a
group as a "people" entitled to self-determination rights.
The subjective approach focuses on the desire of a collection of people
to form a coherent group identity, and under this approach, a "self' defines
itself.285 In other words, in order for a group of individuals to constitute a
"people" deserving the right to self-determination, all the group needs is a
commonly held desire to govern itself. However, this standard suffers from
the fact that it lacks non-arbitrary, exclusive, and inclusive elements.286 A
group might broaden its alleged membership in order to expand its
281 See, e.g., id. at 92.
282 Resolution 2625, supra note 275; Self-Determination: Its Evolution, supra note 34, at
92.
283 Id. at 92-93.
284 A Prima Facie Case, supra note 8, at 171.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 171-172.
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territorial claim. This might infringe upon the rights of others within the
territory who do not completely identify with the group. Thus, such an
amorphous standard creates the potential for hostility between individual
members within the group.287
The objective approach avoids this potential conflict by defining a
"people" according to several specific, non-arbitrary criteria. These criteria
include (1) a common historic tradition, (2) racial or ethnic identity, (3)
cultural homogeneity, (4) linguistic unity, (5) religious or ideological belief,
(6) geographic proximity, and (7) common economic conditions.288 This
non-exclusive list of criteria provides objective ways for groups of people
to categorize themselves. However, the objective approach is not without
its problems. For example, a single person belongs to several different
groups depending on which criterion controls. Thus, conflict may arise
over which criterion or group of criteria will define the group deserving of
self-determination rights.
C. Self-determination Law Applied to Ethiopia
In light of the preceding analysis, it seems unlikely that the TPLF
would be able to legally assert Tigray's independence based on self-
determination. Although Tigray's culture, language, and regional identity
qualifies the region as a "self' under both the subjective and objective
approaches to the term, Tigray does not fit into one of the groups that are
afforded self-determination rights under the United Nations. Specifically,
Tigray is not a colonized land and is not subject to "foreign domination. 289
To the contrary, the Tigray-led TPLF/EPRDF now dominates Ethiopian
politics. 290  Furthermore, UN Resolution 2625 protects the territorial
integrity of sovereign states.291 Tigray's secession would undoubtedly
threaten Ethiopia's territorial integrity. If the TPLF/EPRDF leaders fled
Addis Ababa, then Tigray's secession would leave Ethiopia in chaos and
292without a working central government.
It seems far more likely that other regions of Ethiopia would be able to
assert an internationally-recognized call for self-determination. Both
Oromia and the Ogaden have tried to assert their independence from
Ethiopia, but both have been undermined through the efforts of the
... Id. at 172.
288 Id., quoting the objective factors for self-determination rights listed by the United
Nations Economic and Social Cooperation Organization ("UNESCO").
289 See discussion supra Part II.B.
290 Id.
291 See Resolution 2625, supra note 275.
292 See generally Human Waves, supra note 26.
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TPLF/EPRDF.2 93  Oromia and the Ogaden have distinct cultural
identities.2 94 Furthermore, both are subject to TPLF/EPRDF domination.295
If Oromia and the Ogaden were able to convince the international
community that domination by the TPLF/EPRDF constitutes "foreign
domination," then they would likely qualify as groups deserving self-
determination rights under UN Resolutions 1514 and 2625.
Ethiopia's 1994 Constitution and the TPLF's political dominance
complicate this analysis. The United Nations has never been confronted
with the situations where a regional government's right to secede is
enshrined in a country's constitution, or where a dominant cultural minority
has asserted its independence from the rest of the country based on the self-
determination principle.
296
Conclusion
The Tigray People's Liberation Front has attempted to loot Ethiopia
from within. The TPLF and its political sibling the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front have perpetrated a grand fraud on the
Ethiopian people and the international community. As the preceding
analysis shows, circumstantial evidence of the TPLF's hidden agenda
abounds. The TPLF/EPRDF has established a facade of democracy in
order to garner both internal support and international aid.297 Since 1991,
the Tigray-dominated central government has systematically undermined• ' " Ti a 298
that democracy and diverted Ethiopia's resources to Tigray. In addition,
the TPLF/EPRDF has created a Constitution that gives Tigray the
"unconditional right" to secede from Ethiopia based on the self-
determination principle. 299 In pursuit of a "Greater Tigrai," the TPLF has
expanded the borders of Tigray and attempted to gain access to the Red
Sea.30
0
It remains to be seen whether or not the TPLF will ever be able to
realize the goals set forth in the "Republic of Greater Tigrai."
Undoubtedly, the TPLF's plans were set back immensely by Ethiopia's
failure to capture key territories in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute. The
decision handed down by the Eritrea - Ethiopia Boundary Commission
293 See discussion supra Part II.B.i-ii.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 See supra note 36.
297 See, e.g., Ethiopia Fact Sheet, supra note 29.
298 See discussion supra Part II.B.
299 See, e.g., Ogaden Online Background, supra note 28.
300 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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further hindered the TPLF. However, Ethiopia is preparing a
comprehensive appeal to the EEBC's ruling. The outcome of the appeal
will likely have a significant impact on the future plans of the TPLF.
The Ethiopia - Eritrea border dispute may have caused an ideological
rift in the TPLF's power structure. According to Amnesty International, in
March of 2001, internal conflict within the TPLF led to the expulsion of
twelve members of the organization's Central Committee. 30 ' A number of
regional and security officials were dismissed and some were arrested.3 °2
Over the following months, many important officials left the TPLF.3 °3 In
May, Kinfe Gebre-Medhin, the person in charge of internal security in the
government, was assassinated. In addition, eighteen people, including
two of the twelve officials expelled from the TPLF, were arrested in May
for corruption.30 5 While the underlying causes of these arrests and
expulsions remain unclear, they may signal the demise of TPLF
"hardliners." It is possible that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the other
TPLF members remaining in Ethiopia's central government have given up
on ever asserting Tigray's independence following Ethiopia's failure to
gain access to the Red Sea.
Regardless of whether or not Tigray ever actually tries to secede,
Ethiopia's recent history has presented novel questions to the international
legal community: What is the legal significance of a constitutional right of
secession? Must the international community respect such a right when it is
based in deception? What duty does the U.N. have to intervene when a
dominant minority population uses the concept of self-determination in
order to oppress other minorities?
The international community, led by the United States, has chosen to
ignore these and other questions in the case of Ethiopia. Perhaps the United
States is too concerned with preserving Ethiopia as an ally in the "war on
terror" to question the legitimacy of Ethiopia's "democracy., 30 6 By blindly
aiding Ethiopia and the TPLF, the United States risks creating a populous in
Ethiopia rich with anti-American sentiment. The secession of Tigray would
only provoke more anger and ultimately create the potential for more terror
directed at American interests. The world cannot afford to ignore the
hidden agenda of the TPLF any longer.
301 Al REPORT 2002, supra note 166.
302 id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 id.
306 See Favorable Ruling, supra note 220.
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